Yale University

EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Cowles Foundation

7-1-2012

Decoupling Markets and Individuals: Rational Expectations
Equilibrium Outcomes from Information Dissemination among
Boundedly-Rational Traders
Karim Jamal
Michael Maier
Shyam Sunder

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Jamal, Karim; Maier, Michael; and Sunder, Shyam, "Decoupling Markets and Individuals: Rational
Expectations Equilibrium Outcomes from Information Dissemination among Boundedly-Rational Traders"
(2012). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 2231.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/2231

This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Cowles Foundation at EliScholar – A
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cowles Foundation
Discussion Papers by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at
Yale. For more information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu.

DECOUPLING MARKETS AND INDIVIDUALS:
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES FROM
INFORMATION DISSEMINATION AMONG BOUNDEDLY-RATIONAL
TRADERS

By
Karim Jamal, Michael Maier, and Shyam Sunder

July 2012

COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 1868

COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
YALE UNIVERSITY
Box 208281
New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8281
http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/

Decoupling Markets and Individuals:
Rational Expectations Equilibrium Outcomes from
Information Dissemination among Boundedly-Rational Traders
Karim Jamal, University of Alberta
Michael Maier, University of Alberta
Shyam Sunder, Yale University

Abstract
Attainment of rational expectations equilibria in asset markets calls for the price system
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markets populated by them converge near the equilibrium derived from optimization
assumptions. These findings suggest that market structure is an important determinant of
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Decoupling Markets and Individuals:
Rational Expectations Equilibrium Outcomes from
Information Dissemination among Boundedly-Rational Traders

Our knowledge of the very narrow limits of human rationality must dispose us to
doubt that business firms, investors or consumers possess either the knowledge or
computational ability that would be required to carry out the rational
expectations strategy.
Herbert Simon (1969)
The claim that the market can be trusted to correct the effect of individual
irrationalities cannot be made without supporting evidence, and the burden of
specifying a plausible corrective mechanism should rest on those who make this
claim.
Tversky and Kahneman, 1986, p. S275).
The principal findings of experimental economics are that impersonal exchange
in markets converges in repeated interaction to the equilibrium states implied by
economic theory, under information conditions far weaker than specified in the
theory.
Vernon Smith (2008)

1. Introduction
A central feature of economic theory is derivation of equilibrium in economies populated
by agents who maximize some well-ordered function such as profit or utility. Although it is
recognized that actions of economic agents are subject to institutional constraints and feedback
(North 1990), exploration of the extent to which equilibrium arises from characteristics of the
institutional environment, as opposed to the behavior of individuals, has been limited; Becker
(1962) being a notable exception. The normal modeling technique is to ascribe sophisticated
computational abilities to a representative agent to solve for equilibrium (Muth 1961).
In Sciences of the Artificial, Simon (1969, Chapter 3) questioned the plausibility of
human agents, with their limited cognitive abilities, forming rational expectations by intuition.
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Accumulated observational evidence on these cognitive limits of individuals shifted the burden
of proof, and led to calls for evidence that markets can overcome such behavioral limitations
(Tversky and Kahneman 1986 quoted above; Thaler 1986).
Laboratory studies of markets populated by asymmetrically-informed profit-motivated
human subjects have revealed that their aggregate level outcomes tend to converge near the
predictions of rational expectations theory (Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott 1982; Plott and Sunder
1982—henceforth PS, 1988; and Forsythe and Lundholm 1990). However, since complex
patterns of human behavior can only be inferred from actions, not observed directly, it is difficult
to know from such experiments which elements of trader behavior and faculties are necessary or
sufficient for various kinds of markets to attain their theoretical equilibria. This difficulty has led
some to claim that inability of human beings to optimize by intuition implies that economic
theories based on optimization assumptions are prima facie invalid (Tversky and Kahneman
1986).
Such doubts about the achievability of mathematically derived equilibria, when
individual agents are not able to perform complex optimization calculations, are understandable.
From a constructivist point of view (Smith 2008), rational expectations equilibria place heavy
demands on individual cognition to learn others’ preferences or strategies, and to arrive at
unbiased estimates of underlying parameters of the economy by observing market variables. In
theory, disseminating and detecting information in markets calls for bootstrapping—rational
assessments are necessary to arrive in equilibrium and such assessments require observation of
equilibrium outcomes. Cognitive and computational demands on individuals to arrive at
economic equilibria, especially rational expectations equilibria, are quite high, generating
questions about the plausibility of equilibrium models (Simon 1969).
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Replacing humans by simple algorithms can allow us to decompose the complexity of
trader behavior into simpler elements, and establish causal links between specific characteristics
of trader behavior and market outcomes. Using the Gode and Sunder (1993) approach, we find
and report that in markets with uncertainty and asymmetric information, simple zero-intelligence
adaptive algorithmic traders are able to attain outcomes approximating rational expectations
equilibria. Since the statistical distribution of these outcomes is centered near the PS
observations of markets with human traders, the convergence of their outcomes to equilibrium
can be attributed to the minimal levels of intelligence with which the algorithms are endowed.
Since this level of intelligence is far less than what is assumed in deriving equilibria, it is
reasonable to infer that the convergence of markets to rational expectations equilibria emerge
mainly from the properties of the market and simple and plausible decision heuristics, rather than
from complex and sophisticated optimization (Becker 1962, Gigerenzer et al., 1999, and Smith
2008).

1.1 Background
Economic theory is commonly understood to require individual agents to have
sophisticated information processing capabilities and maximization objectives. However an
alternative conceptualization of how equilibria are attained is that market structure generates
constraints which guide human behavior without making extensive computational demands on
individual problem solving. This conceptualization of structure builds on the work of Becker
(1962), Smith (1962) and Gode and Sunder (1993). Becker (1962) showed that the downward
slope of demand and the upward slope of supply functions arise from individuals having to act
within their budget constraints, even if they choose randomly from their opportunity sets. Smith
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(1962) reported that classroom double auction markets populated by a mere handful of profitmotivated student traders with minimal information arrive in close proximity of Walrasian
equilibrium. Moreover, Smith’s auction markets had little resemblance to the tâtonnement story
used to motivate theoretical derivations.
Gode and Sunder (1993) put Becker’s constrained random choice together with Smith’s
double auctions and reported the results of computer simulations of simple double auctions
populated by ZI (for “zero intelligence”) algorithmic traders who bid or ask randomly within
their budget constraints (i.e., buyers do not bid above their private values and sellers do not ask
below their private costs). Although these traders do not remember, optimize, seek higher profits,
or learn, simulated markets populated by such traders also reach the proximity of their theoretical
equilibria, especially in their allocative efficiency. In simple double auctions without uncertainty
or information asymmetry, theoretical equilibria are attainable with individuals endowed with
only minimal levels of intelligence (not trading at a loss). Jamal and Sunder (1996) extended the
results to markets with shared uncertainty with algorithmic agents using means-end heuristic
(henceforth M-E,) developed by Newell and Simon (1972).
PS found that markets with uncertainty and asymmetrically distributed information (with
two or three states of the world) disseminate information and converge near rational expectations
equilibria when populated with profit-motivated human traders. The present paper examines
whether the PS results can also be achieved without profit maximization on the part of traders.
Do minimally intelligent traders using the M-E heuristic also yield market outcomes predicted by
rational expectations?
Substitution of human subjects of traditional laboratory markets by algorithmic agents
using M-E heuristic has the advantage of helping us gain precise control of traders’ information
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processing and decision making (i.e., “cognitive”) abilities and process. This control allows us to
hold trader “cognition” constant at a specified level and explore the outcome properties of
market structures and environment. In contrast, we can neither observe nor hold invariant the
cognitive processes used by human traders (also, see Angerer et al. 2011; and Huber et al. 2010,
2011). Moreover, use of algorithmic traders enables us to run longer computational experiments,
randomize parameters in the experimental setting, and conduct replications without significant
additional cost in time or money.
The paper is organized in four sections. The second section describes a simple M-E heuristic
used by minimally-intelligent algorithmic traders in a double auction market. In the third
section, we implement this heuristic in a market where some traders have perfect insider
information (while others have no information) and compare the simulation results with data
from the profit-motivated human experiments reported by PS. The fourth section presents the
implications of the findings and some concluding remarks.
2. Means-End Heuristic
Simon (1955) proposed bounded rationality as a process model to understand and explain how
humans, with their limited knowledge and computational capacity behave in complex settings.
He postulated that humans develop and use simple heuristics to seek and attain merely
satisfactory, not optimal, outcomes. To understand human problem-solving Newell, Shaw and
Simon (1957) developed General Problem Solver (GPS). Newell and Simon (1972) adduced a
large body of data which show that GPS is a robust model of human problem-solving in a wide
variety of task environments. The key heuristic used by GPS is means-ends analysis (M-E or the
heuristic of reducing differences). Gigerenzer et al. (1999) have focused on the usefulness and
effectiveness of fast and frugal heuristics like M-E in human life, whereas Tversky and
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Kahneman (1974) have documented a similar heuristic which they relabeled as “anchor and
adjust.”

GPS recognizes knowledge states, differences between knowledge states,

operators, goals, sub-goals and problem solving heuristics as entities. GPS starts with an initial
(or current) knowledge state, and a goal or desired knowledge state. GPS then selects and applies
operators that reduce the difference between the current state and the goal state. The M-E
heuristic for carrying out this procedure can be summarized in four steps: (i) compare the current
knowledge state a with a goal state b to identify difference d between them; (ii) find an operator
o that will reduce the difference d in the next step; (iii) apply the operator o to the current
knowledge state a to produce a new current knowledge state a* that is closer to b than a ; and (iv)
repeat this process until the current knowledge state a* is acceptably close to the goal state b.
Knowledge states of traders can be represented as aspiration levels (Simon 1956) that adjust in
response to experience. The M-E heuristic for a trader thus requires a mechanism for setting an
initial aspiration level, and a method for adjusting these levels in light of experience (e.g., Jamal
and Sunder 1996).
2.1 Market Environment
Market environment is defined by four elements: (1) uncertainty, (2) distribution of
information, (3) security payoffs, and (4) rules of the market. Following PS we examine markets
with either two (X and Y) or three (X, Y, and Z) states of the world, where each state si occurs
with a known probability πi. One half of the traders in the markets are informed about the
realized state of the world before the trading starts each period, while the other half are
uninformed. At the beginning of each period, each trader is endowed with two identical
securities which pay a single state contingent dividend DXj at the end of the trading period.
There are three types of traders and each trader type gets a different dividend in a given state
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(e.g., state x - see Table 1). The rules of the double auction are as follows: after a bid or ask is
generated (see section 2.3 for details on bid/ask generation), the highest bid price is compared to
the lowest ask price. If the bid price is equal to or greater than the ask price a trade occurs. The
recorded transaction price is set to be equal to the midpoint between the bid and ask prices.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 1 about Here
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2.2 Implementing M-E Heuristic
We implement the M-E heuristic in two steps. First, each agent’s initial knowledge state
(aspiration level) is set equal to the expected value of the payoff based on its private information.
The second step implements the idea that subjects without perfect information make gradual
adjustments by applying weight γ (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1) to newest observed price Pt, and weight (1- γ ) to
the past Current Aspiration Level (CALt). This process can be represented as a first order
adaptive process:
CALt+1 = (1 - γ) CALt + γ Pt.

(1)

If CAL0 is the initial value of CALt, by substitution,
CALt+1 = (1 - γ)t+1 CAL0 + γ ((1 - γ)tP1 + (1 - γ)t-1 P2 + … + (1 - γ) Pt-1 + Pt).

(2)

In the context of double auction markets, these two elements of the M-E heuristic—
setting an initial aspiration level and gradually adapting it in light of observed transaction
prices—can be interpreted in appropriate ways. We describe the structure of each market, the
implementation of the heuristic in that market, followed by an examination of the simulation
outcomes, and a comparison of these outcomes with the previously reported results obtained in
laboratory experiments with profit-motivated human subjects.
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2.3 Minimally Intelligent Algorithmic Agents
Algorithmic agents deployed in these markets use an M-E heuristic to estimate a “current
aspiration level” (CAL), and use the CAL to implement a Zero-Intelligence (ZI) strategy after
Gode and Sunder (1993) consisting of bidding randomly below and asking above their aspiration
levels. Traders draw a uniformly distributed random number between 0 and an upper limit of 1.
If number drawn is less than or equal to 0.5, the trader will generate a bid. If the number drawn
is greater than 0.5, an ask will be generated. If the action is a bid, then the amount of the bid is
determined by drawing a second randomly generated number between a lower bound of 0 and an
upper bound of the individual trader’s CAL. This bid is then compared to the highest bid that
currently exists in the market. If the new bid is higher than the existing highest bid, the new bid
becomes the new highest bid in the market. Correspondingly, if the action is an ask, then the
amount of the ask is determined by generating a second random number in the range having a
lower bound of the traders CAL and an upper bound of 1. This newly generated ask is then
compared to the existing lowest ask in the market. If the new ask is less than the existing ask,
then the new ask becomes the new lowest ask in the market. Bids and asks are generated
randomly, distributed independently, identically, and uniformly over these ranges (see Figure 1).
These algorithmic agents are myopic, making no attempt to anticipate, backward induct, or
theorize about the behavior of other traders. They simply use the knowledge of observable past
market events (transaction prices) to estimate their opportunity sets, and choose randomly from
these sets.
Insert figure 1 about here
These markets are populated in equal numbers by traders of each payoff type who are,
and are not, informed about the realized state of world. As shown in Figure 2, the informed
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algorithmic traders begin by setting their initial CAL using the perfect signal they have about the
realized state of the world for any given trader type j:
If realized state = X, CALX= DXj
If realized state = Y, CALY = DYj

(3)1

The uninformed traders of type j use their unconditional expected dividend value to set
their initial CAL using the prior state probabilities:
CALj = Pr(X) * (DXj) + Pr(Y) * (DYj)

(4)2

Since they know the state with certainty, informed traders do not update their CALs in
response to observed transactions; they learn nothing about the state of the world from
transaction prices.3 Uninformed traders of every dividend type, however, update their CALs after
each transaction using the M-E heuristic (i.e., first order adaptive process):
CAL t+1 = (1-) (CAL t) + ( Pt),

(5)

with a given randomly chosen value of the adaptive parameter  for the simulation (see Section
2.4 below). Submission of bids and asks continues with the updated CALs serving as constraints
on the opportunity sets of traders until the next transaction occurs, and this process is repeated
for 10,000 cycles to the end of the period. At the end of each period the realized state is revealed
to all traders, dividends are paid to their accounts, and each trader’s security endowment is
refreshed for the following period. The uninformed algorithmic traders carry their end-of-period
CAL forward and use it in the following period.4
1
2
3

For 3-state markets, if realized state = Z, CALY = DZj.
For 3-state markets, CALj = Pr(X)*(DXj) +Pr(Y)*(DYj)+Pr(X)*(DZj).

The informed traders could, for example, learn that in some states market prices are higher than their own dividend
in that state, and thus raised their CAL to that higher level. Human traders, presumably, make this adjustment but our
algorithmic traders do not. We should not, therefore, expect the markets with these minimally-intelligent agents to
behave identically to the human markets.
4
At this stage, it would have been possible for the agents to keep track of the prices associated with each realized
state and use this information in subsequent periods. In the spirit of minimal intelligence, our agents do not do so,
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In the following period, informed traders again get a perfect signal about the state and set
their CAL = DXj (or DYj ) depending on whether the signal received is X or Y. The uninformed
traders use their end-of-period CAL from the preceding period as CAL0 to trade and to generate
CAL1 after the first transaction, and so on. This process is illustrated in Figure 2.
Insert Figure 2 about here

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2.4 Experimental Design
We use the market design parameters from the PS human experiments for our
simulations (see Table 1). We ran 50 replications of four markets numbered 2, 3, 4 and 5 as
reported by PS’s human experiments (three states in Market 5, and two in the other three
markets).5 The participants were freshly endowed with two securities every period. For each of
the 50 replications, the adjustment parameter γ was randomly and independently drawn from a
uniform distribution U(0.05, 0.5). In each market, there are 12 traders who traded single period
securities. A random state of nature—X, Y, (or Z in case of 3-states)—was drawn at the start of
each period to match the actual realizations observed in the PS markets. Except for a few initial
periods (when no trader was informed), and in some final periods (when all traders were
informed), six of these twelve traders had perfect inside information and the other six were
uninformed. For consistency and ease of reference we identify these markets using the same
numbers as used by PS.6

and uninformed agents simply carry forward their CAL from the end of one period to the beginning of the next
period. The CAL of informed agents responds to a perfect signal about the state realized in each period and is not
dependent on experience in previous periods.
5
PS found that the information structure of their Market 1 was too complex for it to reach rational expectations
equilibrium in less than a dozen periods. Accordingly, we have not tried to replicate that market in these simulations.
6
In this paper we only report periods where one half of the traders in the market are informed and the other half are
uninformed. We have also simulated periods where all traders were informed, or all were uninformed. The results
are not qualitatively different from human participants reported in PS. Full simulation results, including all periods
with informed/uninformed traders are available at http://www.zitraders.com. This website also gives an outline of
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In addition to the design parameters, Table 1 also shows the respective equilibrium
predictions of prices and allocations of the four markets. These markets were designed by PS
such that the price predictions of both the rational expectations and the Walrasian or prior
information (PI) equilibria in the high price states (state X in Markets 2, 3, and 4; states X and Y
in Market 5) are identical. However, in the low-price state (Y in Markets 2, 3, and 4; Z in Market
5), the price predictions of the two equilibrium models are distinct. Also, as shown in Table 1,
the allocation predictions overlap partially in the high-price state(s) but are distinct in the low
price state. These differences in equilibrium predictions allowed PS to conclude that behavior of
their human participants was better explained by the RE equilibria than the competing PI model.
3. Experimental Results – Markets with Asymmetric Insider Information
Figure 3, Panel A shows the time chart of prices observed in five asymmetric information
periods of a market populated with profit-motivated human traders reported in PS against the
background of rational expectations (RE - solid horizontal line) and Walrasian (PI - broken
horizontal line) predictions for respective periods . Panel B shows a time chart of prices from 50
replications and their median (in solid black line) of the same market with M-E heuristic
algorithmic traders. The adaptive parameter γ is randomly and independently drawn each period
from a uniform distribution U(0.05, 0.5) and the same value is applicable to all traders. Six of
the twelve traders have perfect inside information and the other six are uninformed. Allocative
efficiency and trading volume is shown numerically for each period in Panel A of Table 2.
Panels A and B in Figure 3 indicate: (1) In state X (with low RE price of 0.24),
transaction prices of both human traders (Panel A) and algorithmic traders (Panel B) approach
the RE equilibrium level from above. (2) In state Y (with higher RE price of 0.35), transaction
the code, and allows visitors to rerun simulations with their own random seeds, and see the charts of market
behavior dynamically, as well as obtain data files for further analysis.
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prices of both human traders (Panel A) and algorithmic traders (Panel B) generally approach and
get close to the equilibrium level from below. (3) As shown in Table 2, in State X (low RE price)
periods, average trading volume for human traders across the five periods is 19.5 while the
average volume for algorithmic traders is 17.5. The allocative efficiency of human trader
markets across the five periods is 64%, while efficiency of the simulated markets is 81%. Note
that allocative efficiency occurs from having the appropriate number of trades and the securities
being acquired by the appropriate type of trader. These efficiency levels (bellow 100) suggest
the wrong type of trader is accumulating securities in some periods. In State Y (low RE price)
periods, human traders’ average volume is 19.3 (vs. 23.7 for algorithmic traders) and human
trader efficiency is 100%, while algorithmic traders achieve efficiency levels of 99%. This
means the appropriate number of trades is taking place, and securities are being held by the
appropriate trader type.
There are also important differences between the two panels: (1) convergence of prices to
RE predictions in Panel A (with human traders) is tighter and progressively faster in later
periods, as compared to Panel B where there is little change from early to later realizations of the
same state (X or Y). Efficiency results also show human subjects improving over time (when
State is X), whereas markets populated with algorithmic traders show less improvement over
time.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Figure 3 and Table 2 about Here
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Replication of the 2-state markets with different parameters (Figures 4 and 5 and Table 2)
show essentially the same pattern of convergence except that in State Y (low RE price) human
traders have a tendency to converge quickly to the RE price, especially in later periods (not
coming from above or below) whereas the paths with algorithmic traders depend on history in
13

the previous period (because the CAL from the uninformed is carried forward from previous
periods). If the previous period is State X (high RE price) the simulation converges from above,
and if the previous period is State Y (low RE price), the simulation converges from below the RE
price. As expected, algorithmic traders adjust slowly and learn myopically without any global
awareness of equilibrium prices.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Figures 4 and 5 about Here
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 6, Panel A displays data for a three-state market reported by PS with human
traders, and identical market replicated for this paper with algorithmic traders. Figure 6, Panel B
shows a chart of median prices from 50 replications of the same market with minimally
intelligent M-E algorithmic traders. In both panels, the solid horizontal line indicates the rational
expectations (dashed for PI) equilibrium price for the respective periods. Allocative efficiency
and trading volume are shown numerically for each period in Table 2 Panel D, the average
efficiency and volume (across 50 replications) are shown numerically.
Figure 6 indicates: (1) In state Z (with high RE price of 0.32), for both human (Panel A)
and algorithmic traders (Panel B) transaction prices approach and get close to the RE equilibrium
level from below. (2) In state Y (with medium RE price of 0.245), transaction prices also
generally approach and get close to the equilibrium level from below in both panels. The only
exception occurs in Period 11 when the market converges from above in both human and
simulated markets. It appears that moving from a high equilibrium price state to a lower price
state may cause convergences from above. Otherwise, both humans and our simulated traders
tend to be conservative and approach the equilibrium price from below. ((3) Trading volume in
all three states is generally greater than the predicted volume of 16 trades. For human traders
volume tends to range from 15-23 trades, whereas algorithmic traders volume ranges from 14-24
14

trades. (5) In all periods of State Z (high RE price), allocative efficiency for human traders is
100% whereas algorithmic traders achieve 99% efficiency. In State Y (medium RE price)
periods, allocative efficiency of human traders averages 97% (100% efficiency in all periods
except the first realization of State Y) whereas algorithmic traders achieve 95% efficiency and do
not achieve 100% efficiency in any individual period. In State X (low RE price) periods,
allocative efficiency of human traders averages 88% whereas algorithmic traders achieve 92%
efficiency.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Figure 6 about Here
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Table 2 shows volume and efficiency numerically. Again, it is clear that, outcomes of
markets with profit-motivated human and minimally intelligent algorithmic traders exhibit the
same central tendencies of convergence towards the predictions of rational expectations models.
Apparently, the structural constraints of the market rules, and simple means-end heuristics
proposed by Newell and Simon (1972) are sufficient to yield this result even as the number of
states in the market increases from 2 states to 3.
3.1 Statistical Analysis of Price Changes, Volume and Efficiency
To assess price convergence to the rational expectations equilibrium, we report results of
a procedure used by Gode and Sunder (1993) who regressed the root mean squared deviation
between transaction and RE equilibrium prices on the natural logarithm of the transaction
sequence number within a period. If prices move towards RE levels over time, the slope
coefficient of this regression should be less than zero. Four panels of Figure 7 show the behavior
of this root mean square deviation over time for the four human and simulated market pairs.
Results of ordinary least squares regressions of MSD on log of transaction sequence number in
human and simulated markets are shown in two triplets in each panel (slope, p-value, and R2)
15

respectively. Three of the four human (with the exception of Market 2), as well as all four
simulated markets exhibit significant convergence to RE equilibrium, and the zero-slope
hypothesis is rejected in favor of negative slope alternative at p < 0.000 for the seven markets.
Explanatory power is generally high with 80% of the reduction in the deviation from RE
equilibria being explained by log of transaction sequence number. Figure 7 shows that root mean
squared deviation of transaction from RE equilibrium prices tends towards 0.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 7 about Here
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Across all 32 periods of the four markets, the difference between the trading volume
(Figure 8) and efficiency (Figure 9) of human and simulated markets is not statistically different
(average volume of simulated market is about one trade greater than for human markets with tstatistic of 1.35 and the average efficiency of simulated markets is 1.6% lower than that of
markets with human traders (t-statistic of -1.08). There is no significant difference between the
volumes and efficiency of markets with human traders as opposed to algorithmic traders. The
inference is not that these simple algorithms capture all or even most of the behavior of the
humans; that is not true. However, when seen through the perspective of aggregate market
outcomes—prices, allocations, trading volume, and efficiency—these differences get attenuated
to a point of statistical insignificance.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 8 and 9 about Here
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
We have presented evidence that individual behavior, modeled by simple means-end heuristics
and zero-intelligence, yields near-equilibrium market outcomes whose formal derivation requires
strong assumptions about optimization by individual agents. Even if this key assumption of
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theory is descriptively invalid, it does not necessarily undermine the validity and predictive value
of the theory at the aggregate level. Our findings are consistent with Gigerenzer et al. (1999) who
built on Simon’s bounded rationality paradigm by proposing that individuals use “fast and
frugal” heuristics to successfully accomplish complex tasks.
The computational or other “cognitive” abilities of our algorithmic traders do not exceed, indeed
are far weaker than, the documented faculties of human cognition. Yet, these simulated markets
with insider trading based on asymmetric access to information converge to the close proximity
of rational expectations equilibria and attain high allocative efficiency. Contrary to claims made
in behavioral economics literature (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Thaler 1986), we find that
individuals using a simple means-end heuristic (analogous to Tversky and Kahneman’s 1974
anchor and adjust heuristic) in a market setting generate outcomes close to the rational
expectations equilibrium. We interpret the results to suggest that, even in these relatively
complex market environments (compared to Gode and Sunder 1993, 1997, and Jamal and Sunder
1996), allocative efficiency of markets remains largely a function of their structure, not
intelligence or optimizing behavior of agents. Stress on understanding the role of market
structure, rather than human cognition, may help advance our understanding of links between
economic theory and market outcomes.
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Table 1 – Simulation Parameters

Market Corresponding Market State Probability

Dividends For Each Trader Type
Type I

Type II

Type III

RE Predictions
Price
(Allocation to)*

PI Predictions
Price
(Allocation to)*

2 Plott and Sunder 1982
Market 2

X
Y

0.333
0.667

0.1
0.35

0.2
0.3

0.24
0.175

0.24(III)
0.35(I)

0.266(Iu)
0.35(Ii)

3 Plott and Sunder 1982
Market 3

X
Y

0.4
0.6

0.4
0.1

0.3
0.15

0.125
0.175

0.4(I)
0.175(III)

0.4(Ii)
0.22(Iu)

4 Plott and Sunder 1982
Market 4

X
Y

0.4
0.6

0.375
0.1

0.275
0.15

0.1
0.175

0.375(I)
0.175(III)

0.375(Ii)
0.21(Iu)

5 Plott and Sunder 1982
Market 5

X
Y
Z

0.35
0.25
0.4

0.12
0.17
0.32

0.155
0.245
0.135

0.18
0.1
0.16

0.18(III)
0.245(II)
0.32(I)

0.212(Iu)
0.245(IIi)
0.32(Ii)

Plott and Sunder (1982) conducted an experiment with profit oriented human traders to ascertain whether they traded at prices
(and quantities) predicted by rational expectations models. Table 1 shows the parameters used in the experiment and the
predictions about price and which trader type should hold securities in these markets. Our simulation uses the same parameters as
those used in the PS experiment.

*Allocation code: I, II, and III for all traders of types I, II, and III respectively. Ii for informed traders of type I, Iu for uninformed
traders of type I, and similarly for informed and uninformed traders of types II and III.
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Table 2: Transaction and Efficiency Data
Panel A - Number of Transactions (Efficiency Levels) of Market 2
Period (State)
Human Data
Simulation (50 Reps)

7 (X)

8 (Y)

9 (X)

10 (Y)

11 (Y)

Avg.

22
(57%)
19
(78%)

19
(100%)
25
(99%)

17
(70%)
16
(83%)

19
(100%)
25
(99%)

20
(100%)
21
(98%)

19.4
(85.4%)
21.2
(91.4%)

Panel B – Number of Transactions (Efficiency Levels) of Market 3
Period (State)
Human Data
Simulation (50 Reps)

3 (Y)

4 (X)

5 (Y)

6 (Y)

7 (X)

8 (Y)

9 (X)

10 (Y)

Avg.

15
(79%)
14
(87%)

19
(100%)
25
(100%)

15
(88%)
12
(81%)

14
(89%)
14
(87%)

19
(100%)
25
(100%)

14
(98%)
12
(81%)

15
(100%)
25
(100%)

15
(99%)
12
(80%)

15.8
(94.1%)
17.4
(89.5%)

Panel C – Number of Transactions (Efficiency Levels) of Market 4
Period (State)
Human Data
Simulation (50 Reps)

5 (Y)

6 (X)

7 (Y)

8 (Y)

9 (X)

10 (Y)

11 (X)

12 (Y)

13 (X)

Avg.

17
(92%)
14
(90%)

23
(100%)
25
(100%)

17
(95%)
12
(81%)

12
(93%)
14
(88%)

20
(100%)
25
(100%)

14
(94%)
12
(80%)

21
(100%)
24
(100%)

18
(94%)
12
(81%)

21
(100%)
24
(100%)

18.1
(96.4%)
18.0
(94.1%)

Panel D – Number of Transactions (Efficiency Levels) of Market 5
Period (State)
Human Data
Simulation
(50 Reps)

4 (X)

5 (X)

6 (Y)

7 (Z)

8 (Z)

9 (Y)

10 (Y)

11 (X)

12 (Y)

13 (Z)

Avg.

15
(82%)

16
(94%)

17
(87%)

20
(100%)

23
(100%)

21
(100%)

20
(100%)

18
(87%)

18
(100%)

16
(100%)

18.4
(95%)

14
(93%)

16
(95%)

22
(99%)

23
(99%)

24
(98%)

16
(87%)

21
(97%)

13
(87%)

22
(99%)

23
(99%)

19.4
(95.3%)

Plott and Sunder (1982) conducted an experiment with profit oriented human traders to ascertain whether they traded at prices (and quantities)
predicted by rational expectations models. Table 2 shows the number of transactions and efficiency levels attained by human traders, as well as
simulated algorithmic traders who use a simple linear heuristic to update aspiration levels. The behavior of simulated traders is qualitatively
similar to that of human traders with respect to both number of transactions and efficiency levels in all markets simulated, and across all state
realizations.
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Figure 1: Bid, Ask, and Transactions Algorithm

The algorithmic traders in our simulated markets send a message by first drawing a random number from a uniform
distribution bounded by 0 and 1. If the number is less than or equal (greater than) to 0.5, the message is a bid (ask). If the
message is a bid, the trader draws a second random number from a uniform distribution bounded by 0 and the current
aspiration level (CAL). If the message is an ask, the second random number is drawn from a uniform distribution between
CAL and 1. If the trader’s bid is more than the highest current bid in the market, the former becomes the current bid. If the
trader’s ask is less than the current (lowest) ask, then the former becomes the current ask in the market. When the market
bid is equal to (or exceeds) the market ask, a trade occurs at the mid-point of the bid and ask. Visit www.zitraders.com for
outline of the code.
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Figure 2: Algorithm for Setting Current Aspiration Levels (CAL’s)*

*There are two types of traders in our simulated markets--informed and uniformed. They set a current aspiration level
(CAL) to generate bids and asks. The informed (insider) traders get a perfect signal about the realized state and set their
CAL = their dividend in that state. The uninformed traders set their CAL= expected value, and then update it using a simple
linear updating rule after each transaction. The end-of-period CAL of uninformed traders is carried forward to the next
period. Informed traders do not carry forward CAL from previous periods. Visit www.zitraders.com for outline of the code.
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Figure 3 - Market 2 of Plott and Sunder (1982)
RE (PI) Eq. Prices are State X = 0.24 (0.266), State Y = 0.35 (0.35)
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Panel B - Simulation Data (50 Replications and Median)
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Figure 3 plots the price paths for periods 7-11 of Market 2 in Plott and Sunder (1982) where participants have different information sets. Panel A provides the
price history observed using human participants in PS. Panel B provides data from 50 replications of a computer simulation using algorithmic traders. In both
panels the solid grey line is the rational expectations (RE) predicted price while the dashed line is the prior information (PI) predicted price. Each dot in Panel B
is an observed price and the dark line is the median price observed over 50 replications. The price cloud (of dots) shows the range of prices and how it decreases
over time.
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Figure 4 - Market 3 of Plott and Sunder (1982)
RE (PI) Eq. Prices are State X = 0.4 (0.4), State Y = 0.175 (0.22)
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Panel B - Simulation Data (50 Replications and Median)
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Figure 4 plots the price paths for periods 3-10 of Market 3 in Plott and Sunder (1982) where participants have different information sets. Panel
A provides the price history observed using human participants in PS. Panel B provides data from 50 replications of a computer simulation
using algorithmic traders. In both panels the solid grey line is the rational expectations (RE) predicted price while the dashed line is the prior
information (PI) predicted price. Each dot in Panel B is an observed price and the dark line is the median price observed over 50 replications.
The price cloud (of dots) shows the range of prices and how it decreases over time.
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Figure 5 - Market 4 of Plott and Sunder (1982)
RE (PI) Eq. Prices are State X = 0.375 (0.375), State Y = 0.175 (0.21)
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Figure 5 plots the price paths for periods 5-13 of Market 4 in Plott and Sunder (1982) where participants have different information sets. Panel
A provides the price history observed using human participants in PS. Panel B provides data from 50 replications of a computer simulation
using algorithmic traders. In both panels the solid grey line is the rational expectations (RE) predicted price while the dashed line is the prior
information (PI) predicted price. Each dot in Panel B is an observed price and the dark line is the median price observed over 50 replications.
The price cloud (of dots) shows the range of prices and how it decreases over time.
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Figure 6 - Market 5 of Plott and Sunder (1982)
RE (PI) Eq. Prices are State X = 0.18 (0.212), State Y = 0.245 (0.245), State Z = 0.32 (0.32)
Panel A - Human Data
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Figure 6 plots the price paths for periods 4-13 of Market 5 in Plott and Sunder (1982) where participants have different information sets. Panel
A provides the price history observed using human participants in PS. Panel B provides data from 50 replications of a computer simulation
using algorithmic traders. In both panels the solid grey line is the rational expectations (RE) predicted price while the dashed line is the prior
information (PI) predicted price. Each dot in Panel B is an observed price and the dark line is the median price observed over 50 replications.
The price cloud (of dots) shows the range of prices and how it decreases over time.
27

Figure 7: Root Mean Squared Deviation of Prices from Equilibrium vs. Transaction Number
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To assess price convergence over time towards the rational expectations price, Figure 7 plots the root mean square deviation of prices from the
rational expectations equilibrium by transaction number for both the Plott and Sunder (1982) human traders and the algorithmic traders in our
simulation. For both human and simulated traders the root mean square price deviation tends towards zero. For human Market 4, the first five
root mean squared deviation observations are more than 0.02 for a maximum of 0.145 for transaction 3, and do not appear in the chart. The yscale is chosen to highlight the relationships for the remaining data. OLS regression (MSD = α + β ln transaction No.) estimates of β, p-value
and R2 for human and algorithmic markets are shown numerically inside each chart. For example, the human participants in market 5 have the
following values: β = -0.00082, p-value = 0.000 and R2 = 0.90. These results show that observed prices are converging towards the RE
equilibrium price in all markets except for human participants in Market 2.
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Figure 8: Comparison of Transaction Volume by Market and Period
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Figure 8 provides a comparison of the number of transactions for both the Plott and Sunder (1982) human traders and our algorithm traders.
The mean volume for human traders is 17.81 over 32 periods. The mean volume for the algorithmic traders is 18.78 over 32 periods. Overall
the mean difference between the human and algorithmic traders is 0.97 (t-statistic 1.35 is not significant at 5% level) across all 32 periods.
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Figure 9: Comparison of Efficiency by Market and Period
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Figure 9 provides a comparison of market efficiency for both the Plott and Sunder (1982) human traders and our algorithm traders. The mean
efficiency for human traders is 93.69% over 32 periods. The mean efficiency for the algorithmic traders is 92.06%. Overall the mean
difference between the human and algorithmic traders is -1.625% (t-statistic -1.08 is not significant at 5% level) across all 32 periods.
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